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Herm Hughes submits the following brief in reply to Quintekfs
appellee brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I.

To be entitled to raise issues on appeal, it is

sufficient that the issues were raised in a manner sufficient to
obtain a ruling thereon.

Herm Hughes presented sufficient facts

and arguments at the trial to raise the issues regarding Utah Code
Ann.

§ 7 0A-2-2 07 and waiver.

At the trial, the trial

court

announced that the provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
would govern the case.

In its objections to Quintek f s proposed

findings and conclusions, and at the hearing held December 5, 1990,
Herm Hughes argued the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 and
the issue of waiver clearly and specifically.

The trial court

entered conclusions of law on these issues.
Point II.

Quintek's three theories, Uniform Commercial Code,

statute of frauds, and bid shopping, do not sustain the trial
court's judgment.
U.C.C.

Quintek misapplies Section 2-207 of the Utah

The statute of frauds is satisfied by the writings and

conduct of the parties.

Any alleged bid shopping did not preclude

a contract.
Point III.

Public policy favors enforcing contracts between

general contractors and their suppliers for the sale of goods under
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207.

U.C.C. Section 2-207 has sufficient

safeguards to protect against being bound to unwanted terms. In
this

case,

Quintek

did

not

raise

price

as

an

issue

in

its

objections to Herm Hughes's supplier agreement and presented no

1

evidence that it was prejudiced by herm Hughes's acceptance.
Quintek!s request for a contract is inconsistent

Point IV.

with the position Quintek takes now, that the ten-day acceptance
period

expired.

Any

negotiation

Quintek

pursued

was

on

the

additional terms in the supplier agreement only—not on the terms
of its proposal, which form the basis of the contract.
Point V.

Quintek 1 s Rule 33 argument is without merit because

this appeal has a reasonable basis in both fact and law.
ARGUMENT
I. The trial court had squarely before it the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 07 and
the issue of waiver; these issues are properly
before this court.
The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated the following standard
for determining when an issue has been sufficiently raised in the
trial court to enable the appeals court to consider it:
For a question to be considered on appeal, the
record must clearing show that it was timely
presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon . . . .*
This Court has further refined the standard by stating that if a
matter is sufficiently raised at the trial court level, it may be
raised on appeal if the matter has been submitted to the trial
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make findings
of fact or conclusions of law.2

The record shows that Herm Hughes

raised these issues at the trial court level timely and in a manner

1

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.,
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
2

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987).
2

659 P.2d

that enabled the trial court to rule on them.
A. Herm Hughes raised the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. S 70A-2-207 in the trial court.
The argument that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-2 07 governs the
formation of the contract between Herm Hughes and Quintek in this
case was not raised for the first time on appeal.

As early as the

pleadings, Herm Hughes alleged facts to which that section applies.
At trial, counsel alluded to those facts and made reference to the
elements of that section, and the trial court itself acknowledged
that several sections of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the
case.

By

its

conclusions, by
arguments

at

objection

to

Quintekfs

its own findings and

the

hearing

held

findings

and

conclusions, and by

its

December

proposed

5,

1990, Herm

Hughes

specifically argued that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 applies to this
case.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges in paragraph 8:
Plaintiff sent a Supplier Agreement to
defendant which conformed to defendant's
written
cost
estimate
(bid),
but
defendant failed and refused to execute
said agreement and has failed and refused
to perform pursuant to its telephone bid
and written cost estimate.3
Consistent

with

its pleading,

at

trial

Herm

Hughes

presented

evidence of an offer and acceptance for a contract for the supply
of roof trusses, particularly Quintek f s "Cost Estimate" or bid
(Exhibit 6) and Herm Hughes's Supplier Agreement

(Exhibit 11).

Herm Hughes also put on evidence of conduct that recognizes the
3

Record, page 18 (hereinafter abbreviated as, e.g.,
3

R. 18).

existence of a contract.
At

the

trial,

following

the

presentation

of

plaintiff's

evidence, Quintek moved for dismissal of plaintiff's case.

In

response to the motion, Herm Hughes frankly acknowledged that there
was no agreement signed by both parties.4 But Herm Hughes argued
that the parties had reached an agreement on the terms of Exhibits
6 and 11 that were the same, and that there were no "material" new
terms in Exhibit ll.5
In closing arguments, Herm Hughes argued that the differences
between Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 11 were de minimis6 and that the
supplier

agreement

did

submitted by Quintek.7
in Utah

not

"materially"

differ

from

the

bid

These are the very concepts and terms used

Code Ann. § 70A-2-207.

Indeed, the

import of

these

arguments was not lost upon the trial court:
MR. WEEKS: And we believe, your Honor,
that contrary to Counsel's argument that t h e —
the differences in the Exhibit No. 11 are de
minimus [sic] as to the items that have been
added to the performance.
Exhibit 6 s a y s —
THE COURT:
They may very well be, Mr.
Weeks. I hate to keep interrupting you here,
but I think that the UCC is going to come into
play much more than either of you have
indicated to the Court before this is through.
MR. WEEKS: Well, but even the Code, your
Honor, requires that the—the counter-offers
be—
4

Transcript of trial, page 106, lines 17-22
abbreviated as, e.g., T. 106 11. 17-22).
5

T. Ill 11. 6-11.

6

T. 177 1. 16; T. 181 1. 1.

7

T. 181 11. 14-17.

See Addendum B.
See Addendum B.

See Addendum B.
4

(hereinafter

THE COURT: Yeah, but it handles a lot of
the other problems that have arisen in this
particular case. And that's what I'm—all I'm
saying is that there are a lot of problems
that the Code treats directly by one or other
— o r another section in sales relating to
matters of this nature that I think we're
going to have to give some consideration to,
that's both with respect to what Mr. Lambert
is claiming and with respect to what you're
claiming.
In fact, I glanced at it during our
recess and it is replete with sections that
bear directly on the problem that you're
presenting to me, and I'm not asking vou to
refer to them and expound on them at this
time.
I just want you to know that I know
that there's a lot of law there that I'm going
to have to take a hard look at and try and see
if it will help me resolve the factual issues,
some of which may be important and some may
not.8
After
findings

the txi a]
and

conclusions.9

Herm Hi igl les objec ted

conclusions

and

proposed

tc • Qu i r 1 tek ' s proposed
its

Herm Hughes's proposed finding

own
-.

the Court f i i id tl lat Qu i i itek and! H e r m H u g h e s ,

findings

and

- suggested m a t
t h> * r * •:: x . *

by t h e i r wri tings, had made a contract for the sale v.-: r JO: trusses
on the essential terms of Quintek's bi d proposal.10
o b j e c t e d t<
the minds) -

:.r

-

HK'IUSJUM

no

Herm Hughes

I (t.h.it i l n u n w a s n o m e e t i ncij of

:.rx grounds that there was a meeting of the minds on

the essential terms of an agreement for the supply of roof trusses,
whi cl: i essenti al

ter ins

w^n?

\ husi-» s< *l

i oii h

8

i n Qui ntek '" s bid

T. 177 1. 14 through T. 178 J , 1 6 (emphasis added) ; see also
T. 193 1. 22 through T. 194 1. 1.
9
10

R>

T?

153-157; 188-203.
1QA

See Addenda C ana u.

1

proposal.11

Herm Hughes's proposed conclusions of law specifically

recited the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207, and referred to
that section by section number.12
On December 5, 1990, the trial court held a hearing on Herm
Hughes's objections to Quintek's proposed findings and conclusions.
At the hearing, Herm Hughes argued that this case is a contract
formation case governed by Sections 2-204 and 2-207 of the Utah
Uniform Commercial Code, citing those sections specifically.13
The following excerpt from the transcript of that hearing
shows

that

the

trial

court

clearly

understood

Herm

Hughes's

position and rejected it:
MR. FETZER: I think the Code says that
if you've got a counter-proposal that u n d e r —
under non-U.C.C. contract law would normally
kill the offer, but that proposal essentially
meets the terms of the—excuse me, the
counter-offer essentially meets the terms of
the proposal, you've got a contract on . . .
those points where it meets, and you don't
have it on the other ones if they're material,
but as between merchants, you do if there—the
additional terms are to be construed as
proposals for addition to the contract--this
is
on
the
counter-proposal.
Between
merchants, such terms become part of the
contract unless, and then it lists s o m e —
unless the offer expressly limits acceptance
to the terms of the offer or they materially
alter it, or notification or objection to them
has already been given, or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of that is
received.
11

R. 193, 5 1.

12

See proposed conclusions nos. 1 - 9

13

and 13, R. 189-191.

Transcript of hearing held December 5, 1990, page 9 line 24
through page 11 line 16 (hereinafter referred to as, e.g., Hg.T. 9
1. 24 through 11 1. 16). See Addendum E.
6

And I think Boyd Jacobson gave those
timely, that no, we're not going to agree to
A, B, C, and D, but I don't think A, B, C, and
D
included
the essential terms of the
agreement. , , , That's—that's my view of the
case and i f I'm up in the night, I want to
know.
THE COURT: Well, my problem is, I have
some difficulty with maybe even the Code in a
circumstance such as that. I don't think that
a bidder ought to be put in the position of
having in every case to establish a contract
with the person to whom he submitted that bid
if that person hasn't dc>ile something to
confirm it, and I don't think these Herm
Hughes people did. They were . . . too busy .
. to pay attention to that thing.
That's
the impression I got. . . .
MR. FETZER:
What about that supplier
agreement, your Honor? Is—didn't that:-THE COURT: That was a Johnny-come-lately
thing that gives me some problems, but I don't
think that it's the type of thing that Is
going to make a contract in this case.
You
may convince the Appellate Court to the
contrary, but I gave you my impressions, and
after I sat through this thing, I couldn't, in
good conscience, find sufficient evidence, as
far as I was concerned, to find in favor of
your party.14
The trial court's conclusion of law number 6 reflects the thinking
o f t: 1 1 e t r i a 1 c <:> n i :i : t e x p r e s s e c:i i :i I 11: i e f o r e g o i n g e x c e r p t.15
Herm Hughes does not dispute that the main theory of its case
at trial was that the conduct of Herm Hughes and Quintek showed
* - '
bot*.

;ar , DUO y. :

-*

-*

•• • •

»•;-.- . • , i •; i

.: theory i s recogni zed by
a- i , 7 0A-2-2 07 ( 3 ) .

That Herm.

Hughes did not point out those specific provisions to the trial

14

Hg.T. 68 1, ] 3 through " 1 "
through 3 8 1. ! ; 64 ] 2 3 thro-:if *' 8; 70 1. 12.
15

R.

.-

See Addendum F.
7

Sea also Hg.T
. ^ : tr:r;

court does not matter.

Neither was it inconsistent for Herm Hughes

to admit that it could not pin down the day the contract existed
and at the same time argue that there was a contract.

Utah Code

Ann. §70A-2-204(2) provides: "An agreement sufficient to constitute
a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its
making is undetermined."
provisions

of

the

It is clear the trial court believed the

Uniform

Commercial

Code

were

applicable.

Furthermore, the trial court excused the parties from presenting
arguments regarding those provisions at trial.

Herm Hughes did

present arguments specifically directed to those two sections at
the hearing on December 5, 1990.

The relevant provisions of the

Uniform Commercial Code were squarely before the trial court, the
trial court had a clear opportunity to rule on those theories, and
it did enter a conclusion of law related to them.
B. Herm Hughes raised the
before the trial court.

issue

of waiver

The trial court also ruled on Herm Hughes's argument that
Quintek waived the ten day acceptance limit in its proposal.

The

principal evidence supporting Herm Hughes's theory of waiver is the
testimony of Quintek's president, Boyd Jacobson, a witness for
Quintek.

It was Mr. Jacobson who testified that in the middle of

November 1983 he called Todd Walker, an employee of Herm Hughes and
asked why Quintek had not received a contract.

A few days later,

he went to the office of Herm Hughes to ask for a contract and to
pick up a set of plans.

He testified that Mr. Walker had a set of

8

^~ agreement.16

plans for Quintek and gave him a supplif

•- ^

Herm Hughes's proposed findings JI< .

\\v\ its proposed

conclusion no. 1018 specificaJly addressed the evidence of waiver.
At the December 5, 1 990,
wa iver.19

.

hearing Herm Hughes argued the issue of

c 1 eai: ' 11: Ie <,:o11 rt u nd e r s. t: o od

ar id cons ider ed that

argument:
Now, you've talked about waiver and maybe the
Appellate Court will look at this thing and
say, well, by doing this and doing that, they
waived the right to declare the contract—that
there was no binding contract
I don't know;
but the thing that impressed me at the trial
is that everything that Herm Hughes came up
with, these other people seemed to have a
reasonable and logical explanation for it
apart from the fact that they were intending
to go forward with the contract,
They were
accommodating,
and
that
may
be
their
20
downfall.
The trial court's conclusion no
waiver.21

7 specifically

addresses

Conclusion no. 7 was added after the hearing on December

5, .1 99 0.22
Herm H u g h e s p r e s e n t e d t h e i s s u e s ^f n t ^ h ^ o d e A:v\.
and w a i v e r

i n the

t r i a]

court.

The

:*

i\

Cv , i r t

i s s u e s ; , bi i t i: u l eci on t l l o s e i s s u e s a g a
16

T.

12 6 1 .

17

R.

197-198;

18

R.

1 9 0 ; Addendum D.

19

Hg.T

1.1

20

Hg.T,

62,

21

R.

228,

22

Cf,

R

4 through

I.
13

12 ; ]

considered

, •

20.

Addendum D.

1" "' t h r o u g h

12

I.

12-21.

15 3 - 1 5 4 ,
9

1 M ,• A d d s

K

dum, E .

^

-, -. L-7
those
rliighes

has properly preserved the issues for appeal.
II. The trial court's
judgment
is not
sustainable under the theories advanced by
Quintek.
A. Herm Hughes challenges the trial court's
conclusions of law, not findings of fact.
Herm Hughes does not challenge the findings of fact of the
trial court, except in one minor respect that Herm Hughes has
already

addressed

in its appellant's brief.23

Herm

Hughes

is

therefore not required to shoulder the burden of marshalling all of
the evidence to challenge the findings of fact.

Herm

Hughes

challenges the trial court's legal conclusions.
B. The trial court's
sustained on any of
advanced by Quintek.
Quintek

argues

that

the

judgment cannot be
the legal theories

trial

court's

sustained on alternative legal grounds.
theories:

judgment

can

be

Quintek advances three

Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-204 (Quintek discusses § 2-207,

as well) , Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201

(statute of frauds) , and

alleged bid shopping.
1. Quintek improperly applies Utah Code Ann.
Sections 70A-2-204 and 2-207.
The thrust of Quintek's argument regarding Section 2-2 04 of
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is that there is no contract
because Herm Hughes did not accept Quintek's proposal within the
ten-day period.
Ruling.

This was the trial court's stated ground for its

Herm Hughes has addressed this issue in Appellant's Brief

23

See pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's Brief regarding the date
on which Quintek received the supplier agreement.
10

at pages

17-2 0.

Due to the restrictions

of Ru3 e 2 4 ( c ) ,

which

limits rep] y briefs '' to ai 1 swer i i 1 g ai i} i i.e ; i mat ters set forth :i i i the
opposing brief," Herm. Hughes wi ] 1 not reiterate its arguments here.
Also as part of i ts arguments under Section 2-2 04,
maintains that Utah Code Ann. \

- .-

is not applicable because

Quintek di d not admit there wa ; ; contract.
there :i s a en Dntract

Quintek

Herm Hughes asserts

um the exchange of Quintek f s bid

ar :i si ng

proposal (Exhibit 6) a:i id Herm Hughes's supplier agreement (Exhibit
1 1 ) , and from the conduct of the parties.

This is precisely the

k i n d o f c o n t r a c t f o r m a t i o n i s s I i e 11 I a t I J t z 11 i C o d e A n i i

% 7 0 A - 2 - 2 0 7 (3 )

addresses.
In

its

brief,

Quintek

leaps

past

the

contract

formation

fun c t i o n o f s i i b s e c t i o i I 1 o f § 7 0 A - 2 - 2 0 7 a n d e r r o n e o i I s 1 } e in p h a s i z e s
subsection

whose purpose

J:» : -

terms ; n :-.r i^ceptance are pnri
n- *

;- :

- s Coiii: t

' "*'

ietermine whether

:•: *~hc contract.
. ^( :

c::"'-

additional

:!.>:t question is
.. . L*- -

: ~.elf

states:
In other words, a contract comes into being
when the responsive form is sent, irrespective
of variances in the printed terms.
That is
the first purpose of Section 2-207(1); namely,
to decree that in an exchange of forms
transaction, where the responsive document
repeats the names of the parties, the price,
the description of the goods, the quantity and
the delivery date, it consummates a contract
as an acceptance.
It is a "definite and
seasonable expression" of response that binds
both parties. 24

R. Duesenberg & L. King, Bender's Uniform Commercial Code
Service § 3 05, at 3-5 3
] :i

Cases cited by Quintek in support of the proposition that the
parties must admit that there is a contract do not support that
proposition. Marlene Industries Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45
N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239 (1978), is not relevant because it was
a case under subsection 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-2 07.
The issue of contract formation was not before that court.

Duval

& Co. v Malcom. 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975), is not helpful
to Quintek1s position.

In that case, the buyer's response to the

seller's proposal for a quantities contract differed so materially
on the critical element of quantity that the court concluded there
had been no meeting of the minds.
inapplicable.

It therefore held § 2-2 07

In this case, by contrast, Herm Hughes's supplier

agreement matched Quintek's bid on all essential elements.
In U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Semco Manufacturing, Inc., 562
F.2d

1061, 1067 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1977) the court found that the

sequence of negotiation and the exchange of the buyer's form and
seller's form clearly showed an agreement and an intent to enter
into a contract.

In this case Quintek submitted its bid proposal

and then, less than one month later, went to the office of Herm
Hughes to ask for a contract.

Herm Hughes complied by delivering

the supplier agreement. That conduct, together with the subsequent
conduct of the parties, evinces a clear intent of the parties to
form a contract.
The Court in the U.S. Industries case also examined the terms
of the offer and acceptance to determine if the acceptance diverged
significantly with regard to a dickered term.
12

Finding that it did

not, the Court concluded that a definite and seasonable expression
of

acceptance

had

been

given•

Likewise,

in this

case, Herm

Hughes's supplier agreement left the essential terms of Quintek's
bid intact.

The only modification of those terms was the proposal

to include a ten percent retention.

But that was not a significant

enough diversion to evince a lack of intent to contract.
Quintek cannot escape the formation of a contract on the
essential terms of its proposal by arguing that it did not agree to
the additional or different terms.

The Uniform Commercial Code

does not allow an offeror to welsh on its agreement simply because
the acceptance states terms that are additional to or different
from the offer.

The result is fair because the offeror has at

least the grounds provided in subsection 2 of § 2-2 07 for alleging
that

the

additional

or

different

terms

are

not

part

of

the

contract.
Herm

Hughes

respectfully

suggests

that

the

proper

interpretation of § 2-207, therefore, is not to rely upon the
parties1 subjective intent or even upon their express statements
about whether a contract exists, because the effect of § 2-207(1)
is to allow acceptances that fairly meet the terms of an offer to
"operate as an acceptance," that is, to form a contract.

The

standard should therefore be the standard of the U.S. Industries
case: the responding

form operates as an acceptance unless it

significantly changes a dickered term.25

Accord, J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code
§1-3, pp. 47-48 (3d ed. 1988).
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2. The statute of frauds is satisfied by the
writings and conduct of the parties.
The trial court disregarded the statute of frauds argument
raised by Quintek at the trial court level, Quintek had originally
proposed a conclusion of law as follows:
Any agreement between the parties was
required to be in writing pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, unless
excused by one of the exclusions stated
therein.26
At

the

hearing

on

December

5,

1990,

regarding

plaintiff's

objections to the proposed findings and conclusions, the trial
court stated that he was not influenced by the statute of frauds
and

that

the

finding

was

unnecessary.27

The

findings

and

conclusions signed by the trial court do not contain a conclusion
of law referring to the statutes of frauds although there is a
conclusion (no. 5) referring to partial performance*.28
The trial
correct.

court's

reasoning

on the

It is inapplicable to this case.

statute

of

frauds

is

Either the writings of

the parties formed a contract pursuant to Utah Code* Ann. § 7 0A-22 07, or the conduct of the parties formed such a contract under
subsection 3 of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(3) (in which case "the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which

R. 154.

I2[sic].

Hg.T. 78 1. 22 through 79 1. 19.
R. 229, 55.
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See Addendum E.

the writings of the parties agree")29, or their conduct formed a
contract

pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann.

§ 70A-2-204.

In

either

eventuality, Quintek's bid proposal binds Quintek and Herm Hughes's
supplier agreement binds Herm Hughes to the terms of each that
overlap.

These

terms

are

sufficiently

definite

to

take

the

contract out of the statute of frauds.
None of the cases cited by Quintek applies to the facts of
this case where there has been a written offer and a written
acceptance

as well

as conduct recognizing

the

existence

of a

contract.

None of the cases involved either Section 2-2 07 or

Section 2-2 04 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Nevertheless, if this Court determines that the statute of
frauds applies to the contract between Herm Hughes and Quintek, and
further, that the contract has not satisfied the requirements of
subsection 1 of the Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 regarding a writing,
then Herm Hughes respectfully submits that Quintek's activities in
preparation for manufacturing the roof trusses satisfy subsection
3 of that section, particularly when considered in connection with
the

exchange

of

documents

between

the

parties.

Quintek's

preparations to perform included opening and making entries in a
job log, having shop drawings drafted and approved by an engineer,
and discussing with Herm Hughes the specifications related to those
shop

drawings.

Under

the

circumstances

of

this

case,

where

Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's supplier agreement overlap on
critical terms, and where Quintek prepared shop drawings that were
29

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (3) .
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intended to comply with particular specifications for the Midland
Elementary School Project, there was sufficient protection against
the kind of dishonesty the statute of frauds is designed to avoid.
3. Alleged bid shopping did not affect the
formation of the contract between Herm Hughes
and Ouintek.
The trial court was not

influenced

by Quintek's

evidence

regarding the alleged bid shopping, other than to conclude that
Quintek had reason to wonder what Herm Hughes's intentions were.30
It was after Quintek had learned from Mr. Gilson of the Oscar E.
Chytraus Company that Herm Hughes was supposedly shopping Quintek's
bid that Mr. Jacobson went to Herm Hughes's office and asked for a
contract.

Obviously Quintek was not dissuaded

from seeking a

contract with Herm Hughes. By seeking the contract Quintek revived
the proposal or waived any argument that Herm Hughes could not
accept the proposal.
III. Public policy favors enforcing contracts
formed under Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 07.
Giving effect to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 in this case will
uphold an important public policy in the construction industry:
maintaining the integrity and the predictability of the contracting
process between contractors and suppliers.

One of the purposes of

those who drafted § 2-2 07 of the Uniform Commercial Code was to

30

Hg. T. 28 1. 11 through 30 1. 19; 77 11. 20-25.
See
Addendum E.
Herm Hughes disputes the characterization of its
inquiry with Oscar E. Chytraus Company as bid shopping.
16

keep the welsher in the contract.31

In addition, enforcing § 2-

207(1) according to its terms will bring predictability to dealings
between contractors and suppliers of good.
commercial

sales

neither

contractors

nor

In the context of
suppliers

should

be

surprised that they have consummated a contract when their written
offers and written acceptance overlap on critical, bargained terms.
Nor will either party be bound to additional or different terms
unwittingly, because both will be armed with the tools provided by
subsection 2 to escape such terms.
Quintek complains that applying § 2-2 07 to the circumstances
of this case would violate public policy because materials prices
can change if a contractor is allowed to accept price terms after
substantial time passes.
protect itself.

But Quintek was not without the means to

Quintek could have expressly withdrawn its offer.

Instead, Quintek approached Herm Hughes after approximately two or
two and one-half weeks, requesting a contract.

If price had been

a concern to Quintek after the passage of that time, it could have
made

its

request

conditioned

on

a

presented no evidence that it did so.

new

price

term.

Quintek

When Herm Hughes responded

to Quintek's request by handing Mr. Jacobson a supplier agreement,
Mr. Jacobson made no objection to the price term in the supplier
agreement.

Instead, he objected to such matters as the flow-down

clause, liquidated damages, indemnification, and the ten percent
retention.

Quintek presented no evidence at the trial that the

31

J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2, p. 27
(3d ed. 1988).
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lumber prices actually increased between November 5 (the end of the
ten day acceptance period in its proposal) and the date just after
the middle of November on which Quintek received Herm Hughes's
supplier agreement.
IV.
Quintek waived the
requirement in its bid.

ten

day

notice

Perhaps the pivotal fact in this case is that Boyd Jacobson of
Quintek went to Herm Hughes in mid-November 198 3 and requested a
contract,

Mr, Jacobson did so after the ten day acceptance period

in Quintek's bid had expired, and after Mr. Gilson of the Oscar E.
Chytraus

Company

had

alerted

Quintek

that

Herm

Hughes

was

supposedly shopping Quintek's bid.

When it received the supplier

agreement,

Quintek

anything

acceptance

period

did
having

not

say

lapsed.

about

Quintek

the

objected

ten-day
to

the

additional terms in the supplier agreement, but never objected to
terms that harmonized with its proposal.

Quintek submitted shop

drawings, set up its job file, and had communications with Herm
Hughes about the project.
Quintek characterized this conduct as mere negotiation.
was it?

But

Quintek did not ask for a proposal from Herm Hughes; it

asked for a contract.

Quintek expected to receive a contract even

if Herm Hughes had signed its proposal32, indicating that Quintek
considered the contract to be the consummation of the deal.
What was Quintek negotiating about?

Quintek presented no

evidence that it expected any other terms than those contained in

T. 141 11. 17-22.
18

its proposal

(Exhibit

6).

When

it received

agreement

it did not object to the terms

agreement

that

proposal.

were

consistent

with

the

the

supplier's

in the supplier's
terms

in

Quintek's

Quintek submitted shop drawings, as required by the

plans and specifications.
negotiating
agreement.

only

on

the

Apparently Quintek believed it was
additional

terms

in the

supplier's

That conduct is not inconsistent with the idea that a

contract was formed on the terms of Quintek's proposal.

It does

not demonstrate that Quintek was still asserting the lapse of the
ten-day acceptance period in its proposal.
Quintek cannot have it both ways.

Quintek has presented no

evidence and has asserted no argument tending to show that when it
asked Herm Hughes for a contract, it had any other terms in mind
than those contained in its original proposal.

Therefore, if

Quintek was seeking a contract, it was on those terms.

Quintek

cannot by its silence have the benefit of those terms and still
assert that the proposal containing those terms has expired.

It

cannot on the one hand argue that it wanted a contract, and on the
other hand argue that it did not waive the ten-day acceptance
period in its proposal.
V. Herm Hughes^ appeal is meritorious and not
subject to sanctions under Rule 33(a).
An appeal is not frivolous if it has a reasonable basis in
fact and law.33

Among the facts that form the basis for this

appeal are the exchange of Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's
33

Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Maughan v.
Maucrhan, 770 P.2d. 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989).
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appeal are the exchange of Quintek's proposal and Herm Hughes's
supplier agreement, which overlap on the critical terms for the
supply

of wood trusses; the fact that Mr. Boyd Jacobson, the

president of Quintek, went to Herm Hughes well after the ten day
acceptance period in Quintek's proposal had expired and asked for
a contract; and the facts that Quintek prepared and sent to Herm
Hughes shop drawings, prepared
communications
project.

between

Herm

Hughes

Herm

a job file, and kept a log of

Hughes

believes

and

these

Quintek
facts

regarding

and

this

the

conduct

evidence a contract between the parties.
Herm Hughes bases its legal arguments upon Utah Code Ann.
§§70A-2-207 and 2-204.

Herm Hughes believes that these statutes

apply very helpfully and very directly to the issues in this case.
This appears to be a case of first impression for the application
of

§

2-207(1).

jurisdictions

Herm

Hughes

has

cited

case

together with well-recognized

law

from

authorities

Uniform Commercial Code in support of its position.

other
on the

Finally, Herm

Hughes believes that, even if its appeal is unsuccessful, the
result of this appeal will be greater understanding about the role
of the Uniform

Commercial

Code, particularly

§ 2-207,

in the

relationship between contractors and suppliers in the construction
industry.

Herm Hughes respectfully submits that this is not the

kind of appeal for which sanctions should be imposed.
CONCLUSION
The facts and arguments critical to decision of this case are
properly before this Court on appeal.
20

Those issues include an

provide a basis for concluding that a contract was formed between
Herm Hughes and Quintek for the supply of roof trusses.

Those

issues also include whether Quintek waived the ten day acceptance
period in its proposal when it requested a contract from Herm
Hughes.

On these issues Herm Hughes is entitled to a reversal of

the trial court and an entry of judgment in its favor. That ruling
will vindicate a contractor's expectation that its suppliers will
honor their bids according to their terms, and will give guidance
to the construction industry in the critical context of contract
formation.
Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 1991.
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 7 ^
day of October, 1991, to the following:
D. David Lambert, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
12 0 East 3 00 North
Provo, Utah 84 606

\wp51\cbA90140\bnef

21

ADDENDUM A
STATUTES

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
those relating to the present or future sale of goods.
''Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A
"sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are "conforming" or conform to the contract
when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an
end to the contract otherwise t h a n for its breach. On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based
on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts
an end to the contract for breach by the other and its
effect is the same as t h a t of "termination" except t h a t
the canceling party also retains any remedy for
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
1965
Goods to b e severed from realty —
Recording.
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like
(including oil or gas) or a structure or its materials to
be removed from realty is a contract for the sale of
goods within this chapter if they are to be severed by
the seller but until severance a purported present
sale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an
interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell.
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of
growing crops or other things attached to realty and
capable of severance without material h a r m thereto
but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be
cut is a contract for the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject m a t t e r is to be severed by the
buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the
realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can
by identification effect a present sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any
third party rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an
interest in land and shall then constitute notice to
third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract
for sale.
1977

receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of Subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents
is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1) but which is valid in other
respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale
to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate t h a t the goods are for the
buyer, has made either a substantial beginning
of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court t h a t a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606). 1965

70A-2-107.

PART 2

FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT
OF CONTRACT
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of
frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
contract for the sale of goods for t h e price of $500 or
more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
t h a t a contract for sale has been made between t h e
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract
is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time
a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party

70A-2-202. Final written e x p r e s s i o n — Parol or
extrinsic e v i d e n c e .
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained
or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205) or by course of performance (Section 70A-2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
1965
70A-2-203. S e a l s inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a
contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does
not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and
the law with respect to sealed instruments does not
apply to such a contract or offer.
1965
70A-2-204. Formation in general.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any
m a n n e r sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract
for sale may be found even though the moment of its
making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for indefmiteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
1965
remedy.
70A-2-205. Firm offers.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance
t h a t it will be held open is not revocable, for lack ot
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is
stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three months; o
any such term of assurance on a form supplied by
offeree m u s t be separately signed by the offeror.
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70A-2-206. Offer and a c c e p t a n c e in formation of
contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by
the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to m a k e a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and
by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise
to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of
nonconforming goods, but such a shipment of
nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer t h a t the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror
who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
1965
70A-2-207.

Additional terms in a c c e p t a n c e or
confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the
terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms
on which the writings of the parties agree, together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this act.
1965
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical
construction.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated
occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of
the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any
such course of performance, as well as any course of
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable, express
terms shall control course of performance and course
of performance shall control both course of dealing
and usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on
modification and waiver, such course of performance
shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of
any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
1965
70A-2-209.

Modification, r e s c i s s i o n a n d w a i v e r .

70A-2-302

(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this
chapter needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by
the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this chapter (Section 70A-2-201) must be satisfied if the. contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection
(2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an
executory portion of the contract may retract the
waiver by reasonable notification received by the
other party that strict performance will be required of
any term waived, unless the retraction would be
unjust in view of a material change of position in
reliance on the waiver.
1965
70A-2-210. Delegation of performance — Assignment of rights.
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other
party has a substantial interest in having his original
promisor perform or control the acts required by the
contract. No delegation of performance relieves the
party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either
seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the
other party, or increase materially the burden or risk
imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right
to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right
arising out of the assignor's due performance of his
entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement
otherwise.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary
a prohibition of assignment of "the contract" is to be
construed as barring only the delegation of (to) the
assignee of the assignor's performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my
rights under the contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of rights and unless the language or the circumstances (as in an assignment of (for) security) indicate the contrary, it is
a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes
a promise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable by either t h e assignor or the other
party to the original contract.
(5) The other party may treat any assignment
which delegates performance as creating reasonable
grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to
his rights against the assignor demand assurances
from the assignee (Section 70A-2-609).
1965
PART 3
G E N E R A L OBLIGATION A N D
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT
70A-2-301. General o b l i g a t i o n s of p a r t i e s .
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and t h a t of the buyer is to accept and pay in
accordance with the contract.
1965
70A-2-302. U n c o n s c i o n a b l e c o n t r a c t o r c l a u s e .
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract

ADDENDUM B
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL EXCERPTS

1

there's part performance,

2

have led us to believe that they f re performing, now they

3

can stand back and say there's no written agreement.

4

just does not seem to be the facts in this case.

5

an oral contract h e r e , they don't have to imply anything.

6

I don't think that because they

That

We have

It's clear that the parties had reached an

7

agreement, the terms are clearly defined.

8

documents that have received so much emphasis, Plaintiff's

9

Exhibit 6 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 1 , both of them contain

10

the same terras.

11

11.

12

Each of the

There are no material new terras in Exhibit

Any time anybody b i d s , when they submit that b i d ,

13

they admit that they're bidding in accordance with plans

14

and specifications.

15

in the plans and specifications, they have to be an ICBO

)6

approved truss shop.

17

d r a w i n g s , and right on down the line, each of the provisions

18

that are in the supplier agreement are really just implying

19

to the contract, there's nothing there that is any

20

substantial modification.

21

They have to provide, as we required

They have to

p r o v e — p r o v i d e six shop

And they even picked up the language, and I won't

22

try to jerk that for y o u , as M r . Lambert h a s , I think you

23

can read that paragraph that talks about v/hat the discount

24

is for, and I think the discount w a s granted in accordance

25

with their wish*

They just didn't deliver the trusse
•ncrcpq

Q<

1
2
3

THE COURT:

Well, I intend to examine all of

MR. WEEKS:

I know you will.

them.
And anyway, it's

4

clear, your Honor, that Ilr. Jacobsen said that he would

5

not have been surprised to have a written contract

6

presented to him, and in fact, a written supplier agreement

7

was presented to him.

8

THE COURT: Although he was expecting a purchase

9

order, that was his statement.

10

MR. WEEKS: That's—

11

THE COURT:

That's what he thought he was going

12

to get, but he didn't, and so he—then we turn our

13

attention to the other document.

14

MR. WEEKS:

And we believe, your Honor, that

15

contrary to Counsel's argument that the—the differences

16

in the Exhibit No. 11 are de minimus as to the items that

17

have heen added to the performance.

18

Exhibit 6 says--

19

THE COURT:

They may very well be, Mr. Weeks.

I

20

hate to keep interrupting you here, but I think that the

21

UCC is going to come into play much more than either of you

22

have indicated to the Court before this is through.

23
24
25

MR. WEEKS:

Well, but even the Code, your Honor,

requires that the—the counter-offers b e —
THE COURT:

Yeah, but it handles a lot of the
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1
2
3
4

other problems that have arisen in this particular case.
And that's what I'm—all I'm saying is that there are a
lot of problems that the Code treats directly by one or
other—or another section in sales relating to matters of

5

this nature that I think we're going to have to give some

6

consideration to, thatfs both with respect to what

7

Mr. Lambert is claiming and with respect to what you're

8

claiming.

9

In fact, I glanced at it during our recess and it

10

is replete with sections that bear directly on the problem

11

that you're presenting to me, and I'm not asking you to

12

refer to them and expound on them at this time.

13

want you to know that I know that there's a lot of law there

14

that I'm going to have to take a hard look at and try and

15

see if it will help me resolve the factual issues, some

16

of which may be important and some may not.

17
18
19
20
21
22

I just

MR. WEEKS: And indeed, your Honor, that's the
reason why we're here.
I think, your Honor, you must give consideration
to the fact that we have here documents on both sides which
indicate that for some period of 60 to 90 days, these
parties were progressing down the road to building trusses

23

to be placed in the school, and—and for the defense to

24

claim that all this time, they were waiting for some

25

clarification of their authority, Mr. Jacobsen has testified

There's some reason, your Honor, that all of a
sudden, in February, some three months later, that the
defendant had decided they would not perform.

And never,

until this point, was there any indication that they would
5

J not perform the contract.
And we can speculate about the necessity for a
writing.

8

I parties reached a contract agreement on a given d a y —

9

10

We can speculate on the question of whether the

THE COURT:

W e l l , we've got almost 30 exhibits.

I There's lots of writing in this situation.

11

MR. WEEKS:

And I believe, your Honor, that the

12 I writing on both sides is corroborative.

It indicates that

13 J the parties were heading in the direction where there was
14

going to be the performance that was expected, in both

15

instances by both parties.

16

only thing they had not agreed was on the terms regarding

17

the time of delivery.

18

shown in the documents when they were talking about

19

exchanging plans and setting verification dates, and the

On the dollar amount, and the

And those are the matters that are

20 I other elements of the contract that w e r e , of course, not
21 J included in either of the proposals.
22

We think, your Honor, that the test ought to be

23 | whether the parties reached an agreement.
Wa r h m k

We think they

24

did.

chere were minor matters that may be taken

25

care of by the Cede, and we think ther2 are minor matters

1

that are de minimus that did not affect the ability of the

2

parties to reach an agreement.

3

The objections that were had to the plans and

4

specifications being included in the supplier agreement,

5

right on their Exhibit 6, they wrote being in accordance

6

with plans and specifications.

7

the big problems.
And those plans and specifications require every

8
9

That seemed to be one of

I bidder to assume the obligations of the contract in

10

connection with their subcontract, not the overall

11

interpretation, and if Mr. Jacobsen thought he was somehow

12

stepping into the shoes of Herm Hughes & Sons as a general

13

contractor, that's just a mistaken notion.
And the sub—the supplier agreement did not

14

15

incorporate substantially or materially different form of

16

agreement than that which they had submitted; in fact, it

17

was materially the same.
We believe, your Honor, that we're entitled to

18
19

judgment.

We believe that we're entitled to judgment for

20

the additional costs that were required over and above

21

the bid amount, including that amount for which the discount

22

would have included, and the reason being that it would

23

seem that we didn't give the plaintiffs an opportunity to

24

see whether they would have earned the discount, because

25

the defendants gave notice in February they wouldn?t

i m
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D. DAVID LAMBERT (187"), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

p:quin-fof.lo
Our File No. 15,669

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S AMENDED PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

QUINTEK, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 883000004

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th
day of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president,
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks.
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its
attorney, D. David Lambert

The Court received the evidence of the parties and has

considered the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now
makes the following:

c1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the

State of Utah.
2.

The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof

trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without
doing work on the job site.
3.

In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the-possibility of

bidding on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah.

This

information came through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of
the defendant corporation reviewed the materials available in the form of plans showing
the design criteria.

Defendant prepared preliminary drawings and otherwise acted to

prepare an estimate of its cost to provide roof trusses for the school in question.
4.

On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a

bid proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same
day that the verbal communication took place.
5.

Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983,

as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as
Exhibit 6.
6.

Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was

to be accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document
for plaintiff to sign in acceptance.
7.

Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant.

2
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8.

Plaintiff used defendant's bid in an effort to convince Larry Gilson of

Oscar E. Chytraus Co. to reduce his bid proposal.

Larry Gilson contacted defendant's

president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised him of plaintiff's bid shopping.
9.

The only written response of the plaintiff which directly addressed the

terms of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was
in the form of a Supplier Agreement.

The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were

received by the Court as Exhibit 11. Exhibit

, containing the notes of Don Brown, an

employee of the defendant, gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the
defendant on or about November 30, 1983.
10.

Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and

defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with employees of the plaintiff stating
his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement.
11.

The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are

different than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms:
a.

Specific

terms concerning

indemnification

and assuming

an

obligation directly to the owner.
b.

Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase

price until completion of the project.
c.
12.

Provisions concerning liquidated damages.

Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of

the bid proposal to the plaintiff.

It is unclear which drawings were later submitted to

plaintiff, but certain drawings were sent and discussions occurred relative to possible
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question.

3

13.

Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any

of the trusses for the school in question.
14.

Plaintiff admitted that the date or time when its alleged agreement came

into existence cannot be ascertained.
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There was never a meeting of minds of the parties on the essential terms

of an agreement.
2.

Plaintiff rejected defendant's bid by attempting to shop the bid to the next

lowest bidder.
2.

Any agreement between the parties was required to be in writing pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, unless excused by one of the exclusions stated therein.
None of the exclusions stated therein apply for the following reasons: a) the defendant is
the only party, as the seller or supplier, who could make a claim as to specially manufactured goods; b) defendant has never admitted the existence of a contract; and c) plaintiff
made no payment for any goods or work of the defendant.
3.

No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to

be supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except preliminary drawings, was
ever commenced and plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no
monies to defendant
4.

Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no

estoppel or reliance claims were pleaded or proven.
4

5.

Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice costs to defendant.

DATED this

day of August, 1990.
BY TTCE COURT.

ROBERT J. SUMSION
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

3*\

day of August, 1990.

E. Nordell Weeks, Esq.
136 South Main Street #320
Salt LaKe City, UT 84101
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Clark B. Fetzer (USB 1069)
Patrick S. Hendrickson (USB 5082)
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 South Main
7 00 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1503
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
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HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

'

OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS X3F LAW
AND JUDGMENT
Case No. 883000004

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
QUINTEK, a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.

Plaintiff and appellant, Henri Hughes & Sons, Inc.,
through its counsel, Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson, hereby
objects to Defendant's Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law served on E. Nordell Weeks on August 29,
1990 (the "August findings"), and objects to Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment proposed by defendants
counsel and served on E. Nordell Weeks, counsel for plaintiff,
on October 8, 1990 (the "October findings").

For simplicity,

plaintiff will refer only to the August findings, hereafter
referred to as "defendant's Proposed Findings and
Conclusions."

By stipulation of counsel, the time for

su; oiitting these objections has been extended to this date.
1

OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff objects to the portion of finding no. 3,

in the second sentence, that reads: "in the form of plans
showing the design criteria," and the portion of the third
sentence in finding no. 3 that reads "defendant prepared
preliminary drawings."

Stan Jacobson testified that he "would

assume" that the materials available for the bid were in the
form of plans.

The person who prepared the bid, Don Brown,

did not testify.

The statement that defendant prepared

preliminary drawings in preparation of its estimate is not
supported by the record.

Again, Stan Jacobson testified that

he "would assume" that computer generated drawings were
produced.

He did not testify when those drawings were

produced.
2.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 8 in its entirety.

The first sentence of finding no. 8 is counsel's
characterization of the testimony of Mr. Gillson.

Mr. Gillson

referred to plaintifffs actions as "bid shopping" but that was
the conclusion drawn by Mr. Gillson.

There is no foundation

for Mr. Gillsonfs opinion and the evidence does not support
his characterization.

Plaintiff further objects to finding

no. 8 on the ground that it is irrelevant, immaterial and
unnecessary to a decision of the case.

Defendant's counsel

did not even refer to this evidence in closing arguments.
finding is also highly prejudicial.

2

The

3.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 9 because the

letter and supply agreement were not the only written response
of plaintiff that directly addressed the terms of the bid
proposal of defendant.

One of the terms of the bid proposal

was to supply roof trusses in accordance with plans and
specifications.

Those plans and specifications require

Quintek to provide shop drawings.

Plaintiff exchaned written

correspondence with defendant regarding the shop drawings.
4.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 10. Boyd

Jacobson had discussions with Todd Walker, an employee of
plaintiff.

Mr. Jacobsonfs testimony did not refer to

discussions with any other employee of plaintiff in which Mr.
Jacobson stated his refusal to sign the supplier agreement.
5.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 11(a) because

some of the additional terms in the supplier agreement are not
different from defendant's bid proposal.

Defendants bid

proposal included an undertaking to prepare roof trusses "per
plans and specifications."
to the owner.

Plaintiff had the same obligations

Therefore, under defendant's bid proposal,

defendant had some of the same obligations to plaintiff that
plaintiff had to the owner.
6.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 12 because there

was no evidence that, for this specific project, shop drawings
were done preliminary to defendant's submission of the bid
proposal to plaintiff.

Further, it is not unclear which

3

drawings were submitted to plaintiff.

The drawings that were

submitted are shown in Exhibits 8, 13, 14 and 15.
7.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 13 because the

phrase "never began fabrication" is overly broad, conclusory,
and does not reflect the evidence that shows various
activities of the defendant related to the fabrication of the
trusses.
8.

Plaintiff objects to finding no. 14.

It is true

that counsel for plaintiff admitted in his opening statement
that the exact time when the agreement came into existence
cannot be determined, but counsel!s statement is not an
admission by plaintiff and is not evidence.

It is therefore

inappropriate to base a finding of fact on counsel's
statement.
9.

Plaintiff objects to the findings generally in that

they are incomplete and omit critical facts.
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff accordingly further requests the court to
make the following specific findings of fact:
1.

Plaintiff, a corporation, is a general contractor

engaged in the construction business in Utah.
2.

Defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of

manufacturing roof trusses and other building components which
are supplied as finish products without doing work on the
jobsite.

4

3.

This action arose out of a project for the

construction of the Midland Elementary School in Roy, Utah
(the "project"), for the Weber School District, owner, for
which plaintiff was the general contractor.
4.

The project was to be constructed pursuant to plans

and specifications prepared by John L. Piers, the architect
for the project.
5.

The portion of the plans and specifications for the

project dealing with the wood trusses was set forth in the
General Conditions and General Requirements, Division 1 and
Division 6, WOOD & PLASTIC, Section 6010—lumber and related
items, along with Addendum 1 of the specifications, and the
drawings of John L. Piers.
6.

In late October, 1983, defendant became aware of

the possibility of bidding on the project.

This information

came through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service.
Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost to provide roof
trusses for the project.
7.

On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to

plaintiff by telephone a bid proposal which had been reduced
to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that
the verbal communication took place.
8.

Various other suppliers of wood trusses submitted

bids to plaintiff for the wood trusses required on the
project.

5

9.

Plaintiff used defendant's bid for the trusses in

plaintiff's bid to the owner on the project (Exhibit 7 ) .
10.

Plaintiff received defendant's written bid

proposal on October 27, 1983, as indicated by plaintiff's
date-stamp placed thereon.

Said document was received by the

Court as Exhibit 6.
11.

Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6)

proposed to supply the roof trusses for the project, f.o.b.
jobsite, per plans and specifications, for a price of
v $42,518.00, less an eight percent discount of $3,401.44, if
taken in ten days for a net proposal of $39,116.56.
12.

Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6)

specified that the estimate was to be accepted within ten days
from October 25, 1983, and provided a space at the bottom of
the written bid proposal for plaintiff to sign in acceptance.
13.

Defendant's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6) was

signed by defendant.
14.

Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the

defendant.
15.

Defendant assumed that, if plaintiff had signed

defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), a contract would be
forthcoming from plaintiff.
16.

In about the middle of November, 19 83, Boyd

Jacobson, then President of defendant, spoke by telephone with
Todd Walker, an employee of plaintiff, and inquired why

6

defendant had not yet received a supply contract for the
supply of the trusses.
17.

At the time that Boyd Jacobson spoke with Todd

Walker in mid-November 1983, plaintiff had not yet received a
contract from the owner for construction of the project.
18.

A few days after the telephone conversation

between Boyd Jacobson and Todd Walker in mid-November, 1983,
Boyd Jacobson went to the offices of plaintiff to ask for a
supply contract and to pick up a set of plans for the
manufacture of the trusses,
19.

Plaintiff sent a Supplier Agreement to defendant

under cover of plaintiff's letter dated November 21, 1983.
These documents were received by the court as Exhibit 11.
20.

The supplier agreement enclosed with plaintifffs

letter of November 21, 1983 (Exhibit 11) included the
following terms:

defendant was to supply trusses to

plaintiff, f.o b. jobsite, according to the plans and
specifications for the project, at a price of $42,518, with a
discount of eight percent, ten days.
21.

The supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) contained some

terms that were additional to or different from the terms
stated in defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6).
22.

Defendant refused to sign the supplier agreement

(Exhibit 11) and defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had
discussions with Todd Walker, an employee of plaintiff,
regarding his objections to the supplier agreement.
7

23.

Defendant did not provide written notice of its

objection to the supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) within ten
days after defendant received it.
24.

The plans and specifications for the project

called for specific characteristics of the wood trusses,
including specific design loads for the plates (Exhibits 8,
13, 14, and 15).
25.

Defendant sent shop drawings for the project to

plaintiff, under cover of a letter dated December 13, 1983
(Exhibit 8 ) .
26.

On December 14, 1983, Todd Walker, an employee of

plaintiff, spoke with a person at defendant's office in Provo
regarding his objections to sending the shop drawings to Mr.
Walker.

(Exhibit 12).
27.

On December 15, 1983, plaintiff received the shop

drawings sent by defendant (Exhibits 8 and 13) .
28.

Also on December 15, 1983, plaintiff sent

defendant's shop drawings to E. W. Allen & Associates, the
engineer for the project, for the engineer's review (Exhibit
14).
29.

On December 20, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don

at Quintek regarding the shop drawings (Exhibit 12).
30.

On December 30, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don

at Quintek regarding starting fabrication of the trusses
(Exhibit 1 2 ) .

8

m

31.

On January 3 or January 4, 1984, Todd Walker spoke

with Don at Quintek regarding the design load for the plates
of the trusses (Exhibit 12).
32.

On January 5, 1984, plaintiff received from John

L. Pierce, copies of the shop drawings prepared by defendant,
containing a notation regarding "load factor for plate design
1.33 x design load."
33.

(Exhibit 16).

On or about January 6, 1984, Todd Walker sent to

Quintek shop drawings "approved as noted" with the request to
begin fabrication and to submit the remaining shop drawings
(Exhibit 17).
34.

Defendant maintained a record of the project,

including a record of its contacts with plaintiff regarding
the project.

A portion of this record was admitted as Exhibit

20.
35.

In January 1984, plaintiff notified defendant that

the engineer and/or the architect who had reviewed defendant's
shop drawings had indicated a load factor for the plate design
of 1.33 x design load.
36.

On or about February 8, 1984, defendant informed

Dale Higgs, an employee of plaintiff, that defendant would not
be supplying the roof trusses for the project.
37.

In late February 1984 plaintiff received a

proposal from defendant to supply the trusses for the project
for $48,000.

Defendant's proposal was presented to Glenn C.

Hughes, president of plaintiff, by Bill Norris, an employee of
9

defendant, and was reduced to a written proposal dated
February 22, 1984, which was admitted as Exhibit 19.
38.

Defendant never supplied any of the trusses for

the project.
39.

By their conduct and by their writings, plaintiff

and defendant made a contract for the sale of the roof trusses
by defendant to plaintiff on the following terms:

defendant

would supply roof trusses to plaintiff per plans and
specifications, f.o.b. jobsite, at a price of $42,518.00, less
an 8 percent discount, if taken in 10 days, of $3,401.44, for
a net amount of $39,116.56.
40.

Due to defendant's failure to supply the roof

trusses for the agreed price, plaintiff was required to obtain
the roof trusses from another supplier.
41.

Plaintiff attempted to mitigate its costs of

having the roof trusses supplied by others, by contacting the
next lowest bidders among the roof truss suppliers on the
project, but these suppliers could not supply the roof
trusses.
42.

The cost to plaintiff of obtaining the roof

trusses for the project from another supplier is $8,695.44.
(Exhibits 22 and 24).
43.

Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of

$8,695.44 as a result of defendant's breach of the agreement
to supply the trusses at the agreed price (Exhibits 22 and
24) .
10
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44.

Plaintiff has incurred costs in this action, and

has requested in its complaint that it be awarded its costs.
Plaintiff objects to defendant's proposed Conclusions
of Law as follows:
1.

Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 1.

There was a

meeting of the minds of the parties on the essential terms of
an agreement for the supply of roof trusses, which essential
terms were: defendant would supply roof trusses according to
plans and specifications for the project, f.o.b. jobsite, at a
price of $42,518.00, less an 8% discount, 10 days, of
$3,401.44, for a net amount of $39,116.56.
2.

Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 2 because it is

a characterization by an unqualified witness (see plaintiff's
objection no. 2 to defendant's proposed findings of fact,
above) and because it is irrelevant, immaterial, and
unnecessary to the court's determination.

It is also highly

prejudicial.
3.

Plaintiff objects to the second sentence of the

second Conclusion no. 2 (there are two conclusions number 2 in
the August conclusions) for the following reasons:
(a) Any party, plaintiff or defendant, can claim the
benefit of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-201(3) (a) (regarding
specially manufactured goods); otherwise the statute violates
the principle of mutuality of contracts; the evidence supports
the conclusion that the trusses were to be specially
manufactured for the project; and
11
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(b)

The evidence presented in court demonstrates that

defendant recognized the existence of a contract by its
conduct and the writings of the parties.
4.

Plaintiff objects to Conclusion no. 3.

The conduct

of defendant listed in plaintiff's proposed findings shows a
substantial beginning of the manufacture of the roof trusses
by defendant.

Under the terms of the contract established by

the conduct and the writings of the parties, it was not
necessary that plaintiff pay defendant before receiving goods.
5.

Plaintiff objects to Conclusion No. 4.

Plaintiff's

Complaint alleges in paragraph 6 that plaintiff used
defendant's bid in computing its general contract bid to the
Weber County School District.

Defendant cannot show prejudice

for alleging estoppel or reliance.

Defendant had available to

it the critical documents and information that would disclose
the conduct and the writings of the parties that resulted in
an agreement.

Moreover, defendant prepared a trial brief in

April 1990 that addresses the issue of promissory estoppel.
6.

Plaintiff objects to Conclusion No. 5, because on

the basis of the foregoing proposed findings, the Court can
and should find that plaintiff should recover its damages from
defendant.

No pleading of defendant or ruling of the court

calls for an award of costs to defendant.
PLAINTIFFfS PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff requests the court make the following
specific conclusions of law:
12

1.

The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, Utah

Code Ann. §§70A-2-101 et seq,, applies to this action.
2.

Both plaintiff and defendant are merchants for

purposes of §70A-2-104(1) and (3) and other sections of
Article 2.
3.

The transaction that is the subject of this action,

i.e. the sale of roof trusses by defendant to plaintiff, is a
transaction "between merchants" for purposes of §70A-2-104(3)
and other sections of Article 2.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant reached an agreement for

the supply by defendant and the purchase by plaintiff of roof
trusses for the project on the following terms:

defendant was

to supply wooden roof trusses, f.o.b. jobsite, according to
the plans and specifications on the project, for the price of
$42,518.00, less an 8% discount, 10 days, of $3,401.44, for a
net price of $39,116.56.
5.

The conduct of both plaintiff and defendant,

including the conduct referred to in plaintiff's proposed
findings of fact set forth above, recognizes the existence of
the contract.
6.

An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract

for the sale of the roof trusses may be found even though the
moment of its making is undetermined.
7.

Even though one or more terms of the supplier

agreement (Exhibit 11) were left open, the contract between
the parties for the sale of the roof trusses does not fail for
13

indefiniteness, because the parties intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
plaintiff a remedy.

That basis is the terms of Exhibit 6 and

Exhibit 11 on which the parties agreed.
8.

Plaintiff's supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) was a

definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation of defendant's bid proposal, was sent within a
reasonable time, and operated as an acceptance, even though it
stated terms additional to or different from those contained
in defendant's bid proposal.
9.

Conduct by both defendant and plaintiff,

particularly the conduct set forth in plaintiff's proposed
findings, recognizes the existence of a contract and was
sufficient to establish a contract between plaintiff and
defendant for sale of the roof trusses, even though
defendant's bid proposal was not signed by plaintiff.
10.

By requesting a supply contact and a set of plans

in mid-November 1983, and by its subsequent conduct described
in plaintiff's proposed findings, defendant waived the
requirement that its bid proposal be accepted within ten days
of October 25, 1983.
11.

Plaintiff's letter of November 21, 1983, and the

supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) satisfies the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds §70A-2-201(1) and (2), against
defendant.
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12.

If the agreement between plaintiff and defendant

for the sale of roof trusses was oral, it is nevertheless
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, §70A-2-201(3) ,
because the goods were to be specially manufactured for
plaintiff for use on the project, and defendant made a
substantial beginning of the manufacture of the trusses as set
forth in plaintiff's proposed findings of fact.
13.

Plaintiff and defendant have an enforceable

contract for the sale of roof trusses for the project,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-204 and/or §70A-2-207.
14.

Defendant breached the contract for the sale of

roof trusses by refusing to supply trusses at the agreed
price.
15.

Plaintiff was damaged by defendant's breach in the

amount of $8,695.44.
16.

Plaintiff properly mitigated its damages.

17.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant

the sum of $8,695.44 for breach of contract.
18.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs

incurred herein.
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff objects to the proposed Judgment for the
reasons set forth in its objections to defendant's proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Plaintiff

specifically objects to Item #3 of the proposed Judgment
awarding costs to defendant in the sum of $125.60.
15

The court

has made no ruling nor received any evidence regarding
defendant's costs.

Moreover, defendant's answer does not

request costs.
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff requests that the court enter the following
judgment:
1.

Plaintiff shall and does hereby have judgment

against defendant for the sum of $8,695.44.
2.

Plaintiff shall recover from defendant plaintiff's

costs incurred herein.
DATED this 29th day of October, 1990.
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON

Lark B. Fetzer
U
Clark
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT was mailed, postage
prepaid, this 29th day of October 1990, to the following:
D. David Lambert
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellee
P.O. Box 778
12 0 East 3 00 North
Provo, Utah 84603

wcfb4-24
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ADDENDUM E
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF DECEMBER 5, 1990, EXCERPTS

1

take.

Of course, Herm Hughes objects to the form of the

2

ruling and the final order prepared by Mr. Lambert because

3

it feels that there are some issues that have not been

4

addressed and that's what I'd like to address some of my

5 j comments to.
6 I

As I said, I wasn't at the hearing,but as I read

7

the transcript, at the point of closing argument, it was

8

apparent that the Court, that your Honor, was referring and

g

10
u

j had studied some portions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which your Honor felt, at least as I read the transcript—
I and am paraphrasing, as I understand it, that your Honor

12

felt that those provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code

13

governed the transaction, the negotiations, the occurrences

14

that were the subject: of this lawsuit.

15

support that determination by your Honor and would simply

And I wholeheartedly j

16

point out with regards to some proposed findings and

17

conclusions that we've made, and these don't come out in the

18 | Proposed findings and conclusions by Quintek, by Mr. Lambert,
19

that there art; some specific provisions of the Uniform

20

Commercial Code that seem to apply just very helpfully in

21

this case.

22

useful.

23

outcome.

24
25

They offer some guidance that I think is very

I happen to think they make a difference in the

In any event, I believe they're applicable and
wanted -co pursue that

JL*I

thi^ hearing.

It's very simply put,

1

Herm Hughes could characterize this case as a contract

2

formation kind of a case that's governed by Section 2-204 and

3

2-207 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

4

Exhibit 6 produced at trial which was the Quintek

5

proposal, contained some specifics, the quantity, t h e — p e r

6

plans and specifications reference, the price, the F.O.B.,

7

I believe it was shipping point, but the F.O.&. terms and

8

other elements of that offer.

9

supplier agreement, which was the method by which Herm

10

And Exhibit 1 1 , which was the

Hughes responded to the offer, was the acceptance.

11

And the conduct of t h e parties, particularly the

12

submittal of the shop drawings, which was called for by the

13

contract and by the correspondence of the parties, also

14

indicates that the parties believed that there was a

15

contract and they proceeded in that manner.

16

to m e to be almost a law school examination type of

17

question addressed to 2-204 and 2-207.

18

And this seems

And 2-207 comes into play because there were

19

some provisions in that supplier agreement that Herm Hughes

20

admits were different from the proposal made by Quintek.

21

But under 2-207, those become part of the agreement unless

22

they're objected to or unless they materially alter, and

23

1%m

24

than I am by my paraphrasing, what the effect of those

25

additional provisions a r e , but: let's assume that those

paraphrasing, and tnat Code Section defines more clearly

T

additional provisions, such as liquidated damages, indemni-

2

fication and so on, are not part of the agreement, we still

3

have an overlapping of the critical terms. The nature of

4

the trusses, the plans and specifications, the price, the

5

quantity, the shipping; those are the critical terms to

6

form a contract.

7
8
9

Your Honor was right, as I read the transcript,
in saying that you thought that the U.C.C. had modified the
J mirror image rule of contract formation.

The commentary, as

10

I understand it, and the cases that deal v/ith that issue

11

confirm your Honor's understanding.that the mirror image

12

rule, for purposes of contracts subject to the Uniform

13

Commercial Code, is no longer governing and that an

14

I acceptance that includes additional terms can nevertheless

15

form a contract under the provisions, or s.ubject to the

16

provisions of Article 2, Section 207, 2-207.

17

Your Honor's ruling seemed to be concerned with the

18

fact that Herm Hughes didn't sign Quintek's bid proposal.

19

It could have done that and could have obviated all this

20

difficulty by simply signing the bid proposal, and there's

21

no question that they did not sign it.

22

There—I have two responses to that, your Honor.
One is that Quintek waived that requirement.

More than ten

24

days after that written bid proposal had been

submitted, and

25

there was a ten-day—they requested that within ten days

23

11

1

this bid proposal be accepted by signing on the bottom of

2

the bid proposal, the bottom paragraph of Exhibit 6.

3

than ten days after that was submitted, Boyd Jacobson talked

4

with TodJ Walker of Leriu Hughes and said, have you got a

5

supplier agreement for me?

6

after that, he put that in mid-November, and then a few days

7

after that, whatever raid-November was, he said—and with

8

J your Honor's permission, 1*11 quote from the transcript,

9

it's at Page 127, Line 2.

More

And then he said a few days

"I went up to their office to

10

asK for a contract and pick up a set of plans that was up

11

there."

So, he asked for a contract.
Your Honor, he waived any ten-day requirement and

12

13

he re-opened tne offer, if you will, the offer was still

14

open, he was still looking for a contract. And in response

15

I to that request for a contract, Herm Hughes submitted this

16

supplier agreement, j^nd the supplier agreement and the bid

17

proposal of Quintet overlap on the critical terms, and I

18

19

J believe we've got a—I relieve under the Uniform Commercial
Code, we've got: a contract •
There's a case that I could refer your Honor to

20
21

that was similar in situation to that, it's the case of

22

David J. Tuerney, Jr., Inc. vs. T. Wellington Carpets, Inc.,

23

which is a Ilassachusetts appellate Court case reported at

24

3^2 li.E.

25

counjei, 1*11 share uiooc wxuii you, but that involved—

2d 10GG.

I Lrougnt copies for your honor and for

1

discount, it made Chytraus' bid the low bid.

2

MR. LAMBERT:

Correct.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. FETZER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LAMBERT:

7

THE COURT:

N o w , does the record reveal that?
I believe so, your Honor.
That's the way I remember it.
Exactly.

And anyway, Mr. Gilson interpreted

8

the approach to him as bid shopping, that's the word he

9

used as I remember.

10

MR. LAMBERT:

11

THE COURT:

Y e s , and t h a t ' s —
Came down and says, do you know those

12

guys are bid shopping with your bid.

13

particular stock in the fact that they used the term bid

14

shopping or anything else.

15

t r u e , I think there's an explanation for it.

16

was a question on the bids as to which one was low because

17

of the discount quoted, and they were trying to find out

18

which one would give them the best deal,

19

N o w , I don't put any

Whether it was true or it wasn't
I think there

N o w , the testimony in the record as I remember it

20

with respect to the discount is that Quintek didn't like

21

this retainage situation it had generally utilized and they

22

were willing to offer that ten percent discount if they

23

could get paid and get out of this thing after they'd

24

performed the job.

25

MR. LAMBERT:

Exactly.

28

THE COURT:

And these other people at the time, I

got the impression from s o m e w h e r e — I dream about these thing^
at night after I hear t h e m — t h e y really hadn't made a
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

| decision as to whether they wanted to take the ten percent
or whether they wanted to go with the other bid.

And t h a t f s

what they were looking around for, which I think anybody in
business would d o , but the problem that it poses in this
particular situation, is that you've got Gilson coming down
and telling your people that they 1 re bid shopping with the
bid.
Now, the most that can be said about it was that
the information was relayed to him.
MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:

That's all it's in there for.
And it got your people squirmish.

don't think there's any question about that.
reactions that were observable
MR. FETZER:
THE COURT:

I

Those are the

and—

Well—
— s o what we're n o t — w h a t we're doing

here, we're not trying to reach conclusions that the
plaintiff was bid shopping, but I think t h e — t h e

relevant

20
thing about that episode is that Quintek was told that and
21
had some concerns about what was going o n .

And that's the

22
only thing that it conveyed to the Court.
23
MR. LAMBERT:

And that's why it's there.

24
THE COURT:
25

And I think it's important that it go

1

in there, but I don't know how you particularly want to

2

word it, but I don't think it ought to be worded so strong

3

as to accuse them of bid shopping.

4
5

MR. LAMBERT:
say that—
THE COURT:

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Well, why don't we change that and

But I do think that the testimony, and

it should be there in the record, was that Larry Gilson
contacted Jacobson and said that the plaintiffs were bid
shopping

his bid.
MR. FETZER:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, that's —
Now, what does it say in there?

That's]

my recollection of it. You've got the record.
MR. LAMBERT:

He used those terms and I think that

you—essentially said that, in your—

15

MR. FETZER:

16

THE COURT:

I think—
I mean, if someone comes to me and I

17

was in your client's position and they said that they're up

18

there using your bid to bid shop, I'd get a little excited

19

about it. Anybody would, if they're normal.

20

MR. FETZER:

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

But this—
But that—that's the most that can be

said about that.
MR. LAMBERT:

His objection says Mr. Gilson

referred to plaintiff's actions as, quote, "bid shopping",
close quote.

I'm assuming he got that from listening to

30

1

ten days went b y , that there was nonetheless a contract

2

formed.

3

MR. FETZER:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

Your Honor, may I j u s t —
W e l l , no.

I f m just giving you my

impressions, I'm not trying to argue one way or the other.
And as we've lisconed to che explanations as to

7

why they s^nt this and why they did chat and everything

8

else, there was a definite impression made on the-Court

9

thac if they could have got together and got this thing

10

firmed u p , I can't fix a date on it, they would have still

11

gone ahead with it.

12

Now, you've talked about waiver and maybe the

13

Appellate Court will look at this thing and say, well, by

14

doing this and doing that, they waived the right to declare

15

the c o n t r a c t — t h a t there v/as no binding contract.

16

know; but the thing that impressed me at the trial is that

17

everything that Lerm Hughes came up w i t h , these other

18

people seexaed -co have a reasonable and a logical explanation

19

for it apart from che fact that chey were intending to go

20

forward with the contract:.

21

thac may oe their downfall.

22 I

I donft

They were accommodating, and

^nd then it got down co the nitty-gritty and the

23

sticky part of ic towards che end of the year, and I guess,

24

when was it, it was clear into February, was i t , before they

25

f i n a l l y said we've had enough and we { re not going t o do i t .

my court and Ifve got to do something with it, and if I don'ti
do anything with it, the Court may end up saying youfve got a)
contract*
MR. FETZER:

I may—

MR. LAMBERT:

Well, i t —

MR. FETZER:

I may have misspoken myself there

in that, my reading of the Code, and this is where I would
really appreciate being set right, if I'm wrong.
THE COURT:

Weil, I don't know.

MR. LAMBERT:

Let me see if I can set you right.

I've got a copy of the Code right here.
THE COURT:

You people know more than I do.

MR. FETZER:

I think the Code says that if you've

got a counter-proposal that under—under non-U.C.C. contract
law would normally kill the offer, but that proposal
essentially meets the terms of the—excuse me, that counteroffer essentially meets the terms of the proposal, you*ve
got a contract o n —
MR. LAMBERT:
MR. FETZER:

Vie 11 —
— o n those points where it meets,

and you don't have it on tihe other ones if they're material,
but as between merchants, you do if there—the additional
terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract—this is on the counter-proposal.

Between

merchants, such terms become part of the contract unless,

1

and then it lists s o m e — u n l e s s the offer expressly limits

2

acceptance to the terms of the offer or they materially

3

alter it, or notification or objection to them as already

4

been given, or is given within a reasonable time after notice]

5

of that is received.

6

& n u I think Boyd J a c o b s o n gave those t i m e l y , that

7

n o , we're not going to agree to A, h,

8

think A, E , C, and D included the essential terns of the

9

agreement.

10 I

1ER. L A M E E M :

Well —

MR. FETZER:
12

C, and D, tut I don't

T h a t ' s — t h a t ' s my view of the case

J and if I'm u p in t h e n i g h t , I w a n t t o know i t .

13

THE COURT:

Well, my problem i s , I have some

14

difficulty with maybe even the Code in a circumstance such

15

as that.

16

tne position of having in every case to establish a contract

I don't think that a bidder ought to be put in

17 with the person to whom he submitted that bid if that person
18

nasn'i done something to confirm it, and I don't think these

19

Herm Hughes people did.

They w e r e —

20 I

>1£. F E T 2 2 R :

Now—

21

THE COURT:

22 J

MR. FETZER:

I'm going to, at the risk o f —

23 |

THE COURT:

— c o pay a t t e n t i o n to t h a t t h i n g .

They were too b u s y —

24 | That's an impression 1 got.
25

H E . FETTER;

1
2

THE COURT:

that's just between us girls.

3
4

It's not going to go in the findings,

MR. FET2ER:
your Honor?

5

What about that supplier agreement,

Is—didn't

THE COURT:

that—

That was a Johnny-come-lately

thing

6

that gives m e some problems, but I don't think that it's

7

the type of thing than is going to make a contract in this

8

case.

9

but I gave you my impressions, and after I sat through this

You may convince the Appellate Court to the contrary,

10

thing, I couldn't, in good conscience,

n

evidence, as far as I was concerned, to find in favor of your

12

P a -ty.

13

MR. LAMBERT:

And I am supposed to be back at my

14

office at 4:00 o'clock.

15

plenty.

I thought that two hours would be

16

THE COURT:

17

Should have been.

18

MS- LAMBERT:

19

find sufficient

We're going to let you go.

I have some thoughts on the subject

•chat I'd like to talk to you about —

20

MR. FETZER:

21

MR. LAMBERT:

I'd welcome that, thank you.
— t h a t , because I, obviously, would

22

like to try to convince you that there's some questions in

23

my mind about your application of this statute to the facts

24

of this case.

25

you his feelings on

And I think, you know, the Judge has given
that, and I think 1 c a n —

i

the Court is unable to ascertain from the evidence the date

2

or time when an agreeraent caiae into existence, but I d o n f t

3

know as that's necessary.

4

no a g r e e m e n t —

5

MR. LAMBERT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MPs. LAMBERT:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LAMBERT:

10
11

THE COURT:

I j u s t — I ' m finding that there was]

Right.

I'll

just—

--that ever caine into existence.
That's fine.

I'll

just—

S o , why do we need t o —
—delete

chat.

Why do we need something that says

that we can't ascertain i t %

I—

12

MR. LAMBERT: ' I'll delete it.

13

MR. FETSER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FETSER:

Delete all of 14?
X don't know, I j u s t —
I had an objections- to the conclusions 1

16

of law, nuiiiber o n e , that we w c n f t resolve here today and

17

number two, your Honor, I guess 1 have to defer to you on

18

that.

19

Did shopping.

20

I sense

that you have a question whether that was a

TiiE COURT:

W e i l , I didn't make a finding that

21

there was any bid s n o p p m g .

All I concluded from it is

22

that M r . Lambert's clients had reason to be suspicious of

23

wnat was going o n , then when they didn't get any kind of an

24

acceptance in a timely period of time, they had further

25

reason to wonder what was going o n .

I don't find any

1

communication frora your clients to his clients that, in so

2

many words, says, you guys have got the contract, let's get

3

ready t o — t h e trusses going.

4

sot*\e of the people on the job kept—-they'd used the figure

5

and kept thinking these people had it, but I think what's

5

missing here is*—ie someiliing that

7

guys have cot the contract,

0

Tl-iE COURT:

t\iX\ •

13

,

THE COURT;

14
15
16

17

There just wasn't a contract here.

-;/"UvO^AJ. I

.

out and says you

So, I don't know aocut this meeting

^ | of the minds business.
1<5

comes

I1::) going to—1*11 revise that,

MR, IJ^B^rt?;

10

A lot of little things and

U/\rly .

And the evidence, as far as I was

concerned, wasn't sufficient to convince ;ue to the contrary,
and that basically says it all. . They

had the burden of

proving, and if I1:;* irdsccnstrued the law and ignored basic
facts, then there's let of remedies that can be applied to

18 that.
19

I don't know about the Hui^ber Three, your

20 conclusion there, any agreement was required to be in writing
21 pursuant to that sect-ion or m e Coue*
22

21E. rZTZZE;

Is that Hurler Three in t h e —

23
24

C „^r„.., ~ .„.«, 4 ~ n

25 c on elusion,

"""'~\,-~ ^t

"*T .o .-.> p

"~ ^ *'• 'V'> * i" "' •">r,>'> P i * ~ "r t"^ r^^V"-* ^V* ^ "t*

MR. LAMBERT:
THE COURT:

Okay
But it may be, may be true.

MR. LAMBERT:

That was not a—as far as you were

concerned , that wasn't a particular point, the statute of
frauds?
THE COURT:

No, I —-I think basically what I'm

saying is 1 J ast didn1 t find that the evidence was sufficient
to convince m e that there was a contract between the parties
and Quintek was bound.
Okay

MR. LAMBERT:

I think I'm getting a pretty

good idea of what I need to do here.
THE COURT:

There was no acceptance endorsed on

the—and I found no document showing acceptance and there's
a couple of errors here in that ruling, it's typed i n —
written, there was no document showing acceptance within
that period of time, that's referring to the ten days.

And

then I do comment that plaintiff could have—not could be,
but could have easily net the conditions requested.

That

was—that's a conclusion that probably isn't necessary.
It showed my—it shows ray frustration*
MR. LAMZEET:

That came through, your Honor, and

.f ication.
THE COURT:

And what happened is they brought in

their—who was it, the foreman on the job and all the rest
of

them, and kept testifying.

The impression I got that
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P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH. CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 883000004

Defendant.
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president,
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks.
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court received the evidence of the parties and has considered
the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now makes the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the

State of Utah.
2.

The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof

trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without doing
work on the job site.
3.

In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the possibility of bidding

on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This information came
through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of the defendant corporation
reviewed the materials available through the service. Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost
to provide roof trusses for the school in question.
4.

On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a bid

proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that
the verbal communication took place.
5.

Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983,

as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as
Exhibit 6.
6.

Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was to be

accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document for
plaintiff to sign in acceptance.
7.

Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant and did not

communicate with defendant until late November, 1983.

2

8.

Larry Gilson, of Oscar E. Chytraus Co., prepared and submitted to plaintiff

a bid for the trusses which are the subject of the plaintiffs claims. After the bid openings he
was asked by plaintiff to meet and Mr. Gilson attended a meeting at the plaintiffs office.
During that meeting Mr. Gilson was asked by plaintiff to reduce his bid proposal. After the
meeting, Larry Gilson contacted defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised Mr.
Jacobson that in his opinion plaintiff was bid shopping the Quintek bid.
9.

The only written response of the plaintiff which directly addressed the terms

of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was in the form
of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were received by the Court
as Exhibit 11. Exhibit 20, containing the notes of Don Brown, an employee of the defendant,
gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the defendant on or about November
30, 1983.
10.

Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and shortly after

receiving the supplier agreement, defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with
Todd Walker, an employee of the plaintiff, stating his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement.
11.

The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are different

than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms:
a.

Specific terms concerning indemnification;

b.

Specific terms about assuming direct obligations to the owner;

c.

Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase price

until completion of the project; and
d.

Provisions concerning liquidated damages.

3

12.

Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of

the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear if those same drawings were later submitted to
plaintiff, but a drawing (Exhibit 13) was sent and discussions occurred relative to possible
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question.
13.

Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any of

the trusses for the school in question.
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to establish that there was an agreement

between the parties.
2.

Plaintiffs Supplier Agreement was belated and untimely and did not create a

contract.
3.

Plaintiffs conduct concerning the Oscar Chytraus bid was communicated to

the defendant and made the defendant justifiably suspicious about the plaintiffs intentions. This
fact, coupled with the failure of the plaintiff to act in a timely manner to confirm an agreement
convinced the court that an agreement between the parties was never concluded.
4.

Defendant acted promptly and reasonably to notify the plaintiff that it rejected

the terms proposed in the supplier agreement.
5.

No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to be

supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except a preliminary drawing, was ever
commenced, plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no monies to
defendant.
4

6.

The supplier agreement sent to defendant by the plaintiff, in addition to being

untimely, was materially different than defendant's original proposal.
7.

Defendant's efforts to pursue an agreement with the plaintiff after its offer

expired does not constitute a waiver or otherwise convince the court that an agreement was ever
reached.
8.

Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no estoppel

or reliance claims were pleaded or proven.
9.

Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice-with costs to defendant.

DATED this O

day of December, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

-

v
N

v
>>.

-m
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